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Abstract 
It is widely contended that we live in a „world risk society‟, where risk plays a central 
and ubiquitous role in contemporary social life.  A seminal contributor to this view is 
Ulrich Beck, who claims that our world is governed by dangers that cannot be 
calculated or insured against. For Beck, risk is an inherently unrestrained 
phenomenon, emerging from a core and pouring out from and under national borders, 
unaffected by state power.  Beck‟s focus on risk‟s ubiquity and uncontrollability at an 
infra-global level means that there is a necessary evenness to the expanse of risk: „a 
universalization of hazards‟, which possess an inbuilt tendency towards globalisation.   
 
While sociological scholarship has examined the reach and impact of globalisation 
processes on the role and power of states, Beck‟s argument that economic risk is 
without territory and resistant to domestic policy has come under less appraisal.  This 
is contestable: what are often described as global economic processes, on closer 
inspection, reveal degrees of territorial embeddedness.  This not only suggests that 
„global‟ flows could sometimes be more appropriately explained as international, 
regional or even local processes, formed from and responsive to state strategies – but 
also demonstrates what can be missed if we overinflate the global.  
 
This paper briefly introduces two key principles of Beck‟s theory of risk society and 
positions them within a review of literature debating the novelty and degree of global 
economic integration and its impact on states pursuing domestic economic policies.  
In doing so, this paper highlights the value for future research to engage with 
questions such as „is economic risk really without territory‟ and „does risk produce 
convergence‟, not so much as a means of reducing Beck‟s thesis to a purely empirical 
 
2 
analysis, but rather to avoid limiting our scope in understanding the complex 
relationship between risk and state. 
 
Keywords: Economic Integration, Globalization, Ulrich Beck; Risk Society, 
Economic Risk 
  
 
Beck and global economic risk: introducing key principles and outlining the gap 
in critique 
Over the last three decades, increases in the levels of international economic 
integration have been of continuing interest, with three areas of focus: the historical, 
social and political frameworks within which the liberalising of markets is 
embedded
1
; the degree to which national economic boundaries and territories are 
extending
2
; and the risks that the internationalisation of financial flows poses for 
communities across the world and for the states and politics that govern them.   
Questions concerning economic risk and its role in modern society are situated in 
broader sociological risk discourse
3
, which aims to examine how risk impacts on 
contemporary social life. While there are a number of contributors to what Lupton 
(1999) calls the three major theoretical positions on risk
4
, the groundbreaking work of 
Beck and his theory of risk society provides a compelling contribution. As Nacol 
(2007:25) says, „..nearly every social theory of risk or sociological account of risk and 
society engages with his work‟.   
 
For Beck, modern society has become defined by global risk in the sense that „it is 
increasingly occupied with debating, preventing and managing risks that itself has 
produced‟ (Beck, 2008:¶1). That is, Beck argues that not only has the concept of 
global risk become increasingly central to society, but that it is also a reflexive 
phenomenon - in that dangers infiltrate and affect the same institutions and systems of 
modern society, which both created the risks and failed to control them (Beck, 1999, 
2000, 2006a, 2006b, 2008).  
 
For Beck, risk is aligned with the emergence of global flows and connections, 
particularly the electronic global economy (Elliott, 2002:294)
5
, and it is his contention 
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that because of the interwoven character of economic relationships, risk takes on a 
fluid form (Beck, 2006b:38), rapidly spilling out of and across national borders (Beck, 
1992:23, 1999:8, 2000; Chap1, 2006a, 2006b, 2008). Consequently, Beck sees risk as 
being delocalised spatially, temporally and socially, and hence outside of and resistant 
to the control and power of national states: „[g]lobal risks are the expression of a new 
form of global interdependence, which cannot be adequately addressed by way of 
national politics‟ (Beck, 2006a:8)6.   
 
For Beck „the world…has leapt into a condition governable only through uncertainty‟ 
(O‟Malley 2004:6) and thus national policy as adequately containing global risk is a 
view that „simply do[es] not understand the degree of international dependence and 
the logic of globalization‟ (Beck, 2008:¶3).  Beck‟s emphasis on the global and 
unrestrained nature of risk and its subsequent capacity to act independently from state 
attempts at governing it is an argument raised consistently throughout his works.  So, 
Beck states „..one can say that risk society, through the dynamic of endangerment it 
sets in motion, undermines the borders of nation states..‟ (1992:47, emphasis 
Beck‟s own); „..the global market risk cannot be regulated like national markets.  Nor 
can any national markets resist it with impunity‟ (1999:6-7); „[o]n the spatial plane, 
we find ourselves confronted with risks which pay no regard to the borders of nation 
states or other political entities‟ (2006:44), and „..the world risk society, faced with 
menacing aggregation of global problems that resist national solutions, nation-states 
left to their own devices are powerless, incapable of exercising sovereignty‟ 
(2009:¶6).  
 
While a number of academics have criticised Beck for ignoring the historical impact 
of risk (Fressoz, 2007; Turner 1994), undervaluing the role of cultural perception of 
risk (Alexander, 1996:135), or being too reductive in considering the role of the state 
in managing risk, (O‟Malley, 2004:27) there has been little sociological research 
(Jarvis (2007) excepted) that combines original data collection with theory 
testing/building in examining Beck‟s assertion that national governments have a 
limited capacity to address or buffer citizens from global risk. What is equally 
interesting about the literature surrounding Beck‟s risk society thesis is the seemingly 
accepted fact of its absolute globality.  For example, the claim by Elliott (2009:291) 
that „Beck‟s social theory powerfully confronts the institutional forces which threaten 
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to undo the world as we currently know it‟, not only alludes to the reduced capacity 
for risk to be governed, but it also reports risk as being highly globalised.  But is risk 
really without territory? Are the effects of economic „global‟ risk really so global, or 
does risk experience local points of resistance and reduction formed by domestic 
policies and strategies? These are important questions to ask because as evidenced in 
the literature below, economic integration is not necessarily global (Hirst and 
Thompson, 1999; Hirst et al 2009), nor are its impacts even or experienced uniformly 
across different states and societies (Brady, Beckfield et al, 2005; Garrett, 1998).  
 
 Economic Globalisation: Changing economic territories and transborder flows 
A central argument of academics such as Ravenhill (2008) and Obstfeld & Taylor 
(2004) has been that since the 1970s, economies have become increasingly 
interconnected and are exercised along global lines rather than within the boundaries 
of nation states.  As stated by Ravenhill (2008:3), „the contemporary international 
economic system is more closely integrated than in any previous era‟ and this increase 
in economic interconnectivity is argued to be a defining feature of contemporary 
globalisation (Cohen, 2000:77). From this perspective, the economy is seen to have 
experienced a structural shift away from attachments to national territories to existing 
within a „shared social space‟ (Held and McGrew, 2008:3); a de-territorialisation of 
once domestically bounded space to a new global space (Scholte, 2008)
7
.  
 
In the case of defining and understanding contemporary economic globalisation, 
where the establishment of transnational networks in production, trade and finance is 
characterised by „an increasing speed, quantity [and] geographical spread‟ (Woods, 
2000:3), the perspective of de-territorialisation is key.  Through the merging of 
financial borders and the breaking down of domestic economic territorial structures, 
economies are increasingly considered to be globally interconnected and 
interdependent, resulting in „the creation of what can rightly be called a global 
financial system‟ (Woods, 2000:3). 
 
The link between the growing „extensity, intensity and velocity‟ (Held & McGrew, 
2008:3) of instantaneous electronic transactions with intensified levels of global 
economic integration is maintained to be a significant feature of contemporary 
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economic globalisation. As King & Kendall (2004; 142) suggest in the emergence of 
economic techno-territories,  
globalization is different to internationalization.  Internationalization refers to 
exchanges between nation states – across borders – and has occurred over the 
centuries.  It is not new.  Globalization, however, refers to (economic) 
exchanges that transcend borders and which often occur instantaneously and 
electronically, and is new. 
 
Building on this perspective, Held & McGrew (2008: Chap 4) argue that the 
accessibility, volume and velocity of electronic transactions – which allows for the 
movement of trillions of dollars around the world by investors in the 24-hour 
operation of financial credit, currency and capital markets – is seen to have resulted in 
the transborder (as against cross-border) mobility of economic exchange, and the 
consequent deepening and widening of global financial flows.  
 
One development concerning this widening of global financial flows revolves around 
empirically evaluating the extent of economic global interconnectedness. Besides 
relying on sociological intuition, how do we know that financial markets and 
economic exchanges are more integrated now than in the past?  How is this measured 
and what time in history are the changes benchmarked against?  These questions have 
been of interest to not only social scientists and economists, but also government 
organisations.  Consequently a number of empirical studies have been published, 
along with historical accounts that provide some context to the significance of 
changing economic flows.   
 
For example, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (2001, 2005:5)
8
 and Grieco 
and Ikenberry (2002:214)
9
 argue that economies are deeply globalised, referring to 
the increase in the daily movement on foreign exchange markets from $590 billion in 
1989 to $1,880 billion in 2004 (an increase of approximately 318%).  A similar 
percentage increase has occurred in cross-border trading in derivatives, which 
increased from $880 billion in 1995 to $2,410 billion in 2004 (BIS 2005:16, as cited 
in Held and McGrew, 2008:84).  Brady et al (2007:314), also add weight to the 
perspective that economic globalisation has increased since the late 1960s (which 
coincides with the period of rapid technological growth) and argue, for example, that 
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from 1975 to 2003, total globalisation (defined by them as exports + imports + inward 
and outward direct and portfolio investment as a percent of GDP) rose from 53.4% of 
GDP to 100.5% in 2003
10
.   
 
The explanandum
11
 perspective – has economic globalisation been oversold? 
One of the more influential critics of the explanans position, which argues that 
economic globalisation is novel, are Hirst and Thompson (1999) and Hirst et al 
(2009).  Hirst and Thompson, alongside economic historians such as Helleiner (2008), 
argue that high levels of global economic integration are not historically 
unprecedented
12
. For example, both Hirst and Thompson and Helleiner detail that 
cross-border flows of capital - both short and long-term - were by some accounts 
more significant in the 1870–1914 period than they are today.  As James (2001:12)13 
explains, the UK transferred higher amounts of long-term capital as a share of country 
GDP than any country today. Additionally, Hirst and Thompson (1999:52) maintain 
that the gold standard combined with a number of „monetary unions‟ that allowed the 
cross circulation of currencies (Helleiner, 2008:215) represented an international 
monetary regime that was more highly integrated than is currently
14
.   
 
Hirst and Thompson further argue that the current growth of economic cross-border 
flows is incorrectly labelled as „global‟ in reach.  Instead, they suggest that the 
increases in cross-border economic exchange are best understood as primarily centred 
on a „triad bloc‟ of hegemonic economic powers – Europe, Japan and North America.  
For example, they found that 60% of the foreign direct investment (FDI) flows during 
1991-1996 were between the triad, with all three economic powers dominating as 
both the „originators and destinations for international investment‟ (1999:71). 
Additionally they make the point that „capital mobility is not producing a massive 
shift of investment and employment from the advanced to the developing countries‟ 
(1999:2). These are views that find support with Brady et al (2007:316), who detail 
that „international economic exchange still disproportionately occurs among the 
affluent democracies‟15 and that „although some developing countries appear to be 
narrowing the gap with the affluent democracies, there is still far more shared 
comparability among North America, Western Europe, Japan, and the Antipodes.‟  
Further evidence of regionalised (as against globalised) economic flows and 
subsequent regionalised economic risks can be seen by examining the spread of toxic 
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banking assets during the recent global financial crisis (GFC). Mohan (2009:1) states 
that the intensification of the GFC is argued to have begun following the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, which signalled the freezing of credit and 
lending across commercial banks in the United States and Europe. Interestingly, while 
the losses associated with toxic assets was „incurred by thirty-five separate financial 
institutions‟, (Thompson, 2008:¶6-7), „only one of these was outside of the United 
States or Europe‟ (emphasis author‟s own).  This concentration of risk in the 
American and broader European region „reflects the dominance in capital flows‟ 
(2008:¶7) within these areas and suggests that what are labelled as „global‟ economic 
flows and risks may in fact be less globally and more regionally situated.    
 
This evidence further fits within the position that Hirst and Thompson have taken that 
globalisation is the explanandum: economic globalisation is not unique to current 
times
16
, and can instead be understood as a subset or intensification of another 
phenomenon – namely, internationalisation (1999:7-13). The economic, political and 
social international interconnectedness, which is known as „globalisation‟, can instead 
be explained regionally and as part of a long period of integration between nation 
states (Hirst & Thompson, 2002:248).
17
    
 
Scholte (2008:1474) rejects Hirst and Thompson‟s argument.  Scholte takes the 
perspective that not only are ideas of „globalisation-as-internationalisation‟ redundant 
in so far as they fail to challenge „familiar‟ theory, but also that they „readily imply 
that world social relations are – and can only be – organised in terms of country units, 
state governments and national communities‟.  Scholte‟s view is tied closely to 
Beck‟s (2006b:24) concept of „methodological nationalism‟.  For Beck, a major 
problem with disciplines such as sociology, political science, international relations 
etc is that they are lacking in ingenuity and unprepared for analysing society, because 
their theoretical paradigm continues to view change through the lens of nation state 
boundaries, rather than the lens of global „realities‟. However, Kendall et al (2009:58) 
provide a useful rebuttal to this position, when they argue that „the idea that nation 
states were ever able to exist as isolated societies and to shun the transnational is 
questionable.‟ They support this commentary with historical examples of widespread 
cultural interchange that occurred prior to the Treaty of Westphalia and the 
emergence of what we now understand to be nation states.   
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However considering this, Scholte (2008) - along with King and Kendall (2004:155) - 
provide a warranted comment about whether Hirst and Thompson go too far in 
downplaying or failing to recognise a number of contemporary developments (such as 
technological innovations), which are significantly more accessible and integrated 
into economic transitions than in previous times.  Furthermore, while O‟Rourke and 
Williamson (2004) are supportive of many points made by Hirst and Thompson, they 
also suggest that according to some measures, such as gross capital flows and stocks 
of foreign capital, economic globalisation is greater today than in the belle époque.   
Importantly, however, Hirst and Thompson‟s challenge to the broad assumptions 
made about the homogeneity and degree of economic integration across the globe 
allows us to ask whether similar problems can also be raised about the foundational 
assumptions of the risk society.  Albeit highly mobile, is economic risk as 
omnipresent and universal as Beck argues
18
, or as suggested by Thompson (2008) is 
economic risk less globally situated and more textured by way of its reach, mediation 
and consequence?  
 
Convergence and the state 
An area of contention in literature examining economic globalisation is whether its 
processes undermine the autonomy of the state.  Primarily this dialogue revolves 
around whether economic globalisation processes produces a convergence of states to 
a uniform pattern of organisation (Guillen, 2001:244).  While the heterogeneous 
nature of economic and political globalisation and the debate surrounding whether it 
produces convergence is an entire subfield of scholarly debate
19
; one aspect of this 
literature that examines the impact of increasing transnational economic flows and 
risks on domestic economic polity will be briefly canvassed. 
 
Using a macro-phenomenological approach to globalisation, proponents of world-
system theories, such as Meyer et al (1997), argue that economic globalisation will 
converge to a uniform pattern of organisation (Guillen, 2001:244, 255). However, 
Giddens (1990:64,175, 1991:21-22, 2000:30-31) argues that globalisation is neither 
experienced evenly nor in a predictable, uniform direction.  Garrett (1998) is 
especially relevant in this discussion
20
 as his contention that globalisation produces 
diverse outcomes is based on a strong body of both theoretical and empirical data 
(Guillen, 2000:245)
21
. Garrett tests this divergent thesis in the context of a global 
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political economy by examining macro-economic policies belonging to states with 
different economic structures (particularly welfare state or mixed-economy versus 
laissez-faire or strong capitalist economy). Garrett‟s conclusion is that in reaction to 
economic globalisation, there are „enduring cross-national differences‟ (1998:74) in 
the policy responses of states.  Garrett finds that „governments have pursued policies 
that buffer their citizens from the vagaries of global markets‟ Guillen (2001:246).   
 
Garrett‟s argument about the impact of economic globalisation on the welfare state is 
interesting, given Beck‟s position that domestic policy has limited or no power in 
refracting or controlling global risk (Beck, 2006a:8, 2006b:44).  While Garrett 
maintains that welfare states have expanded since the 1970s, other academics such as 
Huber and Stephens (2001) are more sympathetic to Beck‟s position and argue that 
economic globalisation has resulted in the demise or reduction of the welfare state and 
the consequent attenuation of the capacity of domestic governments to insulate 
against economic risk.  However, a recent study by Brady et al (2005) has shed a new 
perspective on whether economic globalisation (and its attached risks) has impacted 
on welfare states.    By analysing data from 17 affluent democracies that stretch 
across a 26-year time period (using pooled time series analysis), Brady et al (2005) 
determined that economic globalisation has not had either a positive effect (causing 
expansion of the welfare state), a negative effect (causing a demise of the welfare 
state) or a curvilinear effect (causing convergence via expansion and later 
retrenchment) on the welfare state.  Rather they argue that „[g]lobalization does not 
have one overall effect on the welfare state, and what effects it has are most certainly 
relatively small‟.  They further state that „[economic] globalization effects are far 
smaller than the effects of domestic political and economic factors‟ (2005:921).  
Brady et al show us that globalisation and risk are not processes that are experienced 
uniformly; rather they are textured and complex in their impact on different states
22
. 
 
Concluding remarks 
From this brief review of literature, it can be seen that Held and McGrew‟s (2008: xii) 
view that „the debate is still about how far, and to what extent, the world we live in is 
being shaped by global forces and processes‟ is apt in relation to understanding 
economic globalisation.  However, it is also a statement that can be read to include 
risk, as Beck‟s theory of risk society clearly generates an engaging position within the 
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globalisation literature, in considering both the extent and global reach of the risks 
posed by economic integration, and the questions about what power the state holds in 
refracting or insulating against them.   
 
By examining the debates surrounding economic globalisation, this paper has sought 
to highlight the value for future risk discourse to draw on this scholarship and more 
closely engage with Beck‟s dismissal of the capacity of autonomous national 
strategies in altering the mobility of risk.  By setting out some of the diversity of 
opinion in the social science literature as to whether economic integration is truly 
global in its reach and whether the concept of tightly woven and deeply penetrable 
domestic economies has in fact been oversold; this paper suggests that the mobility of 
economic risk may similarly be more complex that what first appears. While in a 
Beckian sense there is a certain universalisation or evenness to risk, the globalisation 
literature discussed in this paper describes a divergence in global flows and 
exchanges.  Importantly, the work of Garrett (1998) and Brady et al (2005) emphasise 
that economic risk, despite its international, interconnected and polycentric character, 
is still responsive to domestic political and economic strategies in terms of how it is 
resisted and mediated. While Beck provides us with an engaging and compelling 
theory that captures the role of risk in contemporary life, further research is required 
to consider both the territory and the structural basis of uncertainty by looking at the 
impact of different states in creating and responding to economic risk.  
 
 
 
                                                        
1 The references are numerous, however, Hirst and Thompson (1999), Hirst et al (2009), Helleiner 
(2008), King and Kendall (2004) are some primary contributors. 
2
 The references here are numerous, e.g. Ravenhill (2008:3), Held and McGrew (2008), Held et al 
(1999), Obstfeld and Taylor (2004), Hirst and Thompson (1999), Hirst et al (2009).   
3
 The discourse surrounding the phenomenon of risk and its impact on modern society has become one 
of the most spirited areas of investigation across a range of disciplines, ranging from sociology, to 
health, politics and cultural studies (Lupton, 1999:1, Mythen, 2007:793).   
4
 According to Lupton (1999), the three main approaches to risk are firstly, the „cultural/symbolic‟ 
perspective (Douglas, 1992); secondly the „risk society‟ approach (Beck, 1992, 1994, 1999, 2000, 2006 
& 2008, and Giddens, 1990, 1991, 2000); and thirdly the „governmentality‟ perspective (Foucault, 
1991) 
5
 See also Mythen (2005:¶3) 
6
 See also Beck (2000: Chap 1) 
7
 Langhorne (2001:3) also picks up on this idea of a new global space and argues that the changes in 
territory have emerged from the development of technology. He interprets the accelerated pace and 
intensification of technological change, particularly since the introduction of the computer and internet, 
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to have had a significant impact on society‟s contemporary geographical, political and economic 
understanding of space. That is, technology ranging from the launch of the steam engine and air travel 
right through to contemporary electronics that enable instantaneous communication (e.g. satellite, 
computer etc), has resulted in people no longer being territorially bound by time, geography, 
government or nationality. From this perspective, like Scholte (2008), Langhorne perceives territory to 
be stretched and traversed across frontiers, rather than something that is fixed or rooted.  
8
 As cited in Held and McGrew (2008:83) 
9
 As cited in Held and McGrew (2008:83) 
10
 It is important to note that this figure includes volatile investments. The empirical investigations that 
includes inward and outward investment tends to fluctuate more than those empirical investigations, 
which examine trade openness as a percentage of GDP only. 
11
 Rosenberg (2000) provides an important insight into why refining globalisation into a tight concept 
has remained so elusive.  He outlines that a major difficulty comes from literature confusing whether 
globalisation explains social phenomena (the cause or the explanans), or whether it is a process that is a 
result of another explanation (the effect or explanandum).  In other words, is globalisation a bi-product 
or subset of another phenomenon (e.g. a consequence of the expansion of capitalism or an intensified 
version of internationalisation) or is globalisation the cause or explainer of unique social change? 
While the boundaries between these globalisation critiques are often hazy, the question of explanans vs 
explanandum is useful in broadly grouping the contrasting perspectives on key issues and questions in 
the globalisation debate
.
  For example, if globalisation is the explanans, this then suggests that the 
nature of contemporary social relations has significantly shifted in such a way that it requires new 
terminology and new explanations to understand it (Scholte, 2008:1472 and Held & McGrew, 2008). 
This perspective raises questions and debates about what impact these new social shifts and new 
explanations have on previously held understandings about society‟s political, economic and cultural 
structures. However, if globalisation is a subset or extension of another explained phenomenon (e.g. 
capitalism) or broader theoretical construct (such as neoliberalism) (King & Kendall, 2004:212), rather 
than being a central explainer of social change, this then suggests that the changes we are witnessing 
are not as novel, significant or historically unprecedented as may appear at surface level (Bairoch, 
2000; Campbell, 2004; Fligstein, 2001; Gilpin, 2001, Hirst and Thompson, 1999; Helleiner, 2008; 
O‟Rourke & Williamson, 1999).  Such a perspective asks for clarification as to „what makes global 
modernity distinctive’ (Scholte, 2008:1477) and not only raises questions about the extent and 
significance of globalisation as a means of analysing contemporary society, but also about how existing 
social theory and perspectives (e.g. internationalism / neoliberalism) can be examined as a means of 
better locating the shifts in social relations.  This approach is especially important in considering the 
role of the state and its impact on global flows of information and economic exchange.   
12
 For more on this, see O‟Rourke and Williamson (1999)  
13
 As cited in Helleiner (2008:215) 
14
 Woods (2000:2) also argues that the assumed large increase in transborder flows of trade, capital and 
people is overstated, and she gives the example of exports increasing by only 1.6% as a percentage of 
GDP from 1913 to 1993, as indication of the exaggerated notion of economic integration. The idea that 
trade exchange is overstated is a debated point by Held et al. (1999), who argues, for example, that 
trade accounts for approximately 20% of all economic output at the end of the 20
th
 century.  In an 
updated consideration of this point, Held and McGrew (2008:82-83) argue that the link between 
finance and trade has become irrelevant in current times, due to the sheer increases on the foreign 
exchange market.   
15
 Brady, Beckfield and Zhao (2007) reference Alderson (2004) with this point.  They also make a 
qualifying remark to this argument though, which is studies in globalisation research are (like most 
disciplines) at least partially based on data availability.  Consequently, as there is a higher amount of 
data for affluent democracies, they tend to be over- represented in the studies. 
16
 See also Gilpin (2001:3), who argues that although globalisation is a defining feature of international 
economy, it remains less globalised than prior to 1914.  Gilpin (2002) and O‟Rourke and Williamson 
(1999) also provide interesting historical contributions to the debate. 
17
 It should be stated quite clearly, however, that Hirst and Thompson do not argue that there is not 
significant economic integration now; rather they are questioning the extent to which economic 
globalisation is sold as something new.  For example, they write „This is not to minimize the level of 
integration now, or to ignore the problems of regulation and management it throws up, but merely to 
register a certain skepticism over whether we have entered a radically new phase in the 
internationalization of economic activity’ (1999:60) 
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18
 As argued by Mythen (2005:¶17 ) „Beck fails to adequately account for the diverse impacts and 
consequences of different hazards’. 
19
 See Guillen (2001) for a useful guide to pertinent literature 
20
 Garrett‟s work sits within a large amount of literature that examines economic globalisation and 
debates whether its processes undermine the nation state.  For example, a number of scholars such as 
Brady, Beckfield and Zhao (2007); Fligstein (2001); Gilpin (2001); Hay (2008); Hirst and Thompson 
(1999); ORiain (2000); Rose (1999:141); Sassen (2006); Wolf (2004) and Wilensky (2002) take 
Garrett‟s position that state power remains powerful despite shifting boundaries. It is not a position that 
has gone unchallenged, with what Held et al (1999) terms the „hyperglobalist‟ positions of Hardt & 
Negri (2001), Omae (2002), Rodrik (1997) and Strange (1996), who argue that the new global epoch of 
globalisation is eroding (or has eroded) the relevance of the state.  Of course the boundaries between 
the two perspectives are often hazy, with a number of scholars such as Held et al (1999), Held & 
McGrew (2008), King and Kendall (2004), who argue that while the states still hold necessary and 
strong authority, their power has been impacted in varying degrees by economic and political 
globalisation.   
21
 Garrett‟s data was collated and compared using a comparative sociological method. 
 
22 Of course, the capacity for states to mediate the risks aligned with international economic integration 
gains additional currency when considering China‟s protection of its financial borders from significant 
economic risk during the GFC. In addition to strict banking regulations and state restrictions on capital 
flow, which assisted in protecting China against potential toxic assets (Nanto et al, 2009:67); China 
was able to focus on continued domestic economic growth by employing expansionary fiscal policies 
to counteract any reduction in exports to the US and Europe (Fischer, 2009:2; IMF, 2009).  
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